Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that military personnel typically aren't responsible for war crimes because situational factors such as battlefield stress and military training undermine their capacity to recognize morally relevant features of their environment, and thus they should be excused for their wrongdoing. In this chapter we challenge this conclusion and demonstrate that this account is inadequate as an explanation of war crimes and a theory of responsibility. Drawing on social cognitivist accounts of personality, we show how military training instills values, beliefs, and emotions in soldiers that inform their uses of violence in ways that can contribute to war crimes. Even though military personnel can't fully control the dispositions they develop through military training, we argue that perpetrators of war crimes are responsible for their behavior if their actions express morally objectionable attitudes that justify their victims in blaming them. Our account of responsibility thereby respects the perspective of victims' perspective in a way neglected by many competing accounts of responsibility.
Introduction
In this chapter we address the following questions: Do war crimes result primarily from failures of character or from situational influences, and are those who commit war crimes morally responsible for their actions? In response to the first question, we argue that a certain type of situationist account of war crimes is mistaken, and we offer an alternative dispositional account of war crimes. In response to the second question, we argue in favor of a theory of Forthcoming in Christian Miller (ed) , Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015) Draft only -please do not cite without permission 2 responsibility under which military personnel may be held morally responsible for war crimes in most cases regardless of whether situational forces or dispositions influenced their behavior. 1
Situationism, War Crimes, and Responsibility
A large body of experimental research in social psychology is thought to support situationism: 2 the view that human behavior is explained to a surprising extent by the situational factors to which an agent is exposed, rather than by the agent's pre-existing temporally stable and cross-situationally consistent character traits. One of the striking findings of these experiments is that seemingly minor situational factors appear to disproportionately influence behavior in situations where we would expect even weak character traits to have a much stronger influence. For example, in Stanley Milgram's famous experiments on destructive obedience, the experimenters were able to persuade normal adults to deliver what they thought were increasingly painful shocks to another person even when that person demanded to be released from the experiment. 3 In another famous experiment, Philip Zimbardo and his colleagues placed willing, "normal, healthy American college students" (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo 1973, 89) in a simulated prison environment housed on the campus of Stanford University. Very shortly after the experiment began, the students role-playing prison guards began to mistreat the students posing as prisoners. Zimbardo concluded that the behavior he observed was "the result of an intrinsically pathological situation which could distort and rechannel the behavior of essentially normal individuals" (1973, 90) .
Experiments like those of Milgram and Zimbardo are often thought to tell us something about the commission of war crimes. It is therefore not surprising that a number of philosophers and psychologists (Doris & Murphy 2007; Roth 2004; Snow 2009b; Zimbardo 2004 Zimbardo & 2008 Forthcoming in Christian Miller (ed) "propels external determinants of behavior to the foreground, well beyond the status as merely extenuating circumstances" (2004, 21) . Unlike characterological accounts, situationist accounts of war crimes look to the external situational forces to which individuals are subjected for the explanation of their destructive behavior.
Situationist accounts of war crimes are not only characterized by a focus on the objective features of the situations in which agents act, such as whether a situation exposes agents to extreme stress. Situationist accounts also typically involve a particular conception of the relationship between an agent's mental states such as beliefs, goals, emotional states (and so forth) 4 and external situational forces. While some situationist accounts acknowledge that agents' mental states can play an important causal role in the commission of war crimes, these mental states are themselves construed as the product of external situational forces, such as exposure to ideology. Thus it is sometimes claimed that because these mental states are imposed upon the agent, the agent's moral responsibility may be called into question, a point we will discuss in Section 3.
John Doris and Dominic Murphy (2007) defend a situationist account of war crimes that explores the effects of both immediate and temporally extended situational factors on soldiers'
behavior. In addition, they explore the implications of their account for soldiers' moral responsibility for war crimes, arguing that the strength of the situational forces to which soldiers are exposed supports: "a strong general presumption that perpetrators of wartime atrocities are not morally responsible" (2007, 28) . Forthcoming in Christian Miller (ed) (2007, 26) , then perhaps they are excused for their behavior. This conclusion follows from the belief⎯accepted by many philosophers⎯that an agent is morally responsible for her behavior only if she possesses "normative competence": the capacity to assess and respond to moral reasons.
5
According to Doris and Murphy, two kinds of situational forces cause cognitive and emotional 6 degradation in soldiers: situational pressures on the battlefield itself, and "'distal,' or 'wasting' pressures," which are "circumstances that may profoundly affect military personnel, beginning at considerable spatial and temporal distance from the point at which atrocity occurs" (2007, 39) . Both these kinds of situational forces, they claim, degrade soldiers' normative competence to the point that they can no longer appropriately exercise their capacity for moral reflection or recognise the moral impermissibility of certain kinds of behavior, factors that can increase the likelihood that they will be involved in the commission of war crimes.
7
The evidence for the extremely debilitating physical, cognitive, and emotional effects of combat is very strong (Fontana & Rosenheck 1999; Frésard 2004 ) and so we share Doris and Murphy's view that "the presence of excusing conditions in combat is highly probable" (2007, 38 (2007, 39) ), dehumanization of the enemy, and exposure to racist and other political ideologies justifying the use of extreme violence against perceived enemies. In summary, the combination of these processes "reconfigures the range of available behavioral options" (2007, 39) for soldiers. As a result, it may no longer be reasonable to expect perpetrators of war crimes who have been exposed to these forces to see their behavior as morally wrong. In Doris and Murphy's view, this outcome arises because distal pressures restrict the scope of soldiers' moral reasoning so that soldiers may cease to possess the ability to come to alternative judgments about how to behave. In the case of war crimes, this may mean that it is unfair to hold perpetrators responsible for their behavior because it is unreasonable to expect them to avoid such behavior since, through no fault of their own, they regard their actions as permissible. We will consider the plausibility of this view of responsibility in Sections 3 and 4.
A Dispositional Approach to War Crimes
One problem for Doris and Murphy's approach is that it fails to account for the variety and degree of perpetrators' enthusiasm for their tasks. It is difficult to explain these differences among perpetrators by reference to situational forces alone, since perpetrators exposed to what (Blass 1993, 34 & Shoda 1996) , and has gained support from both social psychologists (Ross & Nisbett 2011) and philosophers (Russell 2009; Snow 2009a) . 10 According to this theory, it is a mistake to see personality as comprised of a set of cross-situationally stable character traits that guide an individual's behavior in a way that is largely independent from the specific situations in which she acts.
Instead, personality should be understood as a Cognitive-Affective Personality System (CAPS): "a dynamic system or organized network of interconnected and inter-acting cognitions and affects" (Mischel & Shoda 1996, 417) that is activated in social settings. In CAPS theory a situation cannot be characterized without understanding how agents in that situation construe the meaning of the situation, and how that construal interacts with their pre-existing beliefs, goals, and self-conceptions. In fact, CAPS theory challenges the very legitimacy of the distinction between the person and the situation. As Mischel and Shoda explain, "the concept of 'situation' must go beyond external stimuli to encompass internal, intrapsychic conditions and states in which people's experiences and actions are contextualized" (1996, 422) . What the situation is for an individual therefore cannot be determined merely from the objective features of the situation but depends crucially on how agents interpret the meaning of that situation. This is in contrast to situationist theories that depict human behavior as resulting from a battle between the force of situations and the power of the person, where the former typically overcomes the latter (Mischel & Shoda 1996, 421) . CAPS theory is therefore unique in rejecting the assumption that we can determine the meaning of situations independently from how agents' construe the meaning of those situations.
In CAPS theory character traits can be conceived of as interconnected "social-cognitive" units involving beliefs, emotions, and judgments that are "activated in response to situational variables … or internal stimuli" (Snow 2009a, 31-33) . 11 Repeated "activation" of these cognitive-affective units leads to relatively stable behavioral patterns and traits. Nancy Snow illustrates this process through a discussion of how a person may develop the trait of irritability.
Like other CAPS traits, the trait of irritability consists of "thoughts, affects, and representations of plans, strategies, and values, … ready to be activated through external stimuli or even through internal stimuli, such as thoughts or imaginings " (2009a, 32) . When the irritable person is exposed to certain stimuli (for example, when someone bumps into her on the street) this that is "psychologically salient" to the agent (Miller 2014, p. 117) . Similarly, the theory offers an explanation for why an agent's behavior might vary considerably across situations that seem (to the outside observer) very similar if those situations lack such a feature. To illustrate, suppose that, due to a traumatic childhood incident, Marissa is frightened of people in uniforms (police officers, fire-fighters, military personnel, and so forth) and consistently reacts to the sight of such individuals by actively avoiding them (walking the other way, for example). To an external observer, situations involving people in uniform might be very different from each other. It is only when we understand the meaning that "people in uniforms" has to Marissa that we can understand the consistency of her actions as arising from a stable disposition related to her unique personal history and psychological makeup.
On our view, CAPS theory provides the most promising framework through which to examine the causes of war crimes. In contrast to Doris and Murphy's view, we suggest that the beliefs and attitudes (and resultant behavior) that are inculcated through military training and culture are not properly thought of as external or alien to individual soldiers. Instead, we argue that military training and culture leads to the development of CAPS traits in individual soldiers by interacting with and shaping their goals, actions, beliefs, and emotions related to their military honor, loyalty, self-discipline, and integrity (Wolfendale 2007, 54) . This process succeeds if and when individual soldiers successfully internalize these ideals in ways that have significance for them, given their own particular goals and self-conceptions. Thus while the closed environment of the military means that there is likely to be significant conformity in soldiers' beliefs about how and why they fight, there are still important individual differences between soldiers that reflect the unique ways that soldiers understand the meaning and significance of their military service.
In relation to war crimes, this approach provides important insights into how soldiers can come to view war crimes as permissible and consistent with military values, being a good soldier, and with their own self-image. Research on the causes of war crimes (Bandura 1999; Frésard 2004 ) has found that war crimes are likely to occur when the following conditions apply:
a specific act or policy, such as a policy of torture, has been authorized and rationalized by military authorities; those executing the policy see their role as requiring obedience; the policy's intended subjects have been dehumanized; the practice has been "sanitized" (for example, can lead to what psychologist Albert Bandura calls "moral disengagement" where an agent's "moral self-sanctions can be dis-engaged from inhumane conduct" (1994, 194) . This process of disengagement is essential in order for those involved in the commission of war crimes to be able to maintain an intact self-image and self-approval (Bandura 1994, 196) .
The factors listed above have in common the aim of cultivating specific beliefs, emotions, goals, and self-conceptions in those who will carry out these actions. However, it would be a mistake to interpret the above list as representing a set of on-going external situational or distal forces that "imprint" soldiers with particular beliefs. He took pride in his hard work, writing, "Everyone admired my work" (2011, 347) . These and other diary entries reveal that Landau's self-image was tied closely to his perception of himself as a good worker and a good soldier, who did not behave excessively or sadistically in carrying out his orders. In fact, he was critical of overly "enthusiastic" shooters (2011, 348) . In contrast, Karl Kretschmer, a German pharmacist who served in a unit operating in the Russian Front that carried out mass executions, suffered serious psychological distress at his participation in the killings. However, unlike Landau, Kretschmer interpreted the killings as necessary to protect the German race from the existential threat posed by the Jews ("My comrades are literally fighting for the existence of our people" (2011, 349)), and construed his distress as evidence of personal weakness rather than as evidence of any immorality in what he was required to do.
These examples illustrate how two individuals involved in essentially the same war crimes and exposed to similar situational forces in combat and during training interpreted the meaning of their actions in very different ways. These differences affected how and why they acted as they did. For example, Landau's distaste for killing unarmed civilians and his focus on being a good worker meant that he did not pursue the killing of civilians if he was able to avoid it (by, for example, volunteering for other tasks), and when killing was required of him rejected any display of sadism or enjoyment in killing as simply unprofessional. On the other hand, Kretschmer's belief in an existential threat posed by the Jews to the German people allowed him to justify the Nazi's genocidal project as a form of national self-defense. Thus, he saw his personal challenge as overcoming his revulsion and so he actively sought to become better at his work: "it is a weakness not to be able to stand the sight of dead people; the best way to overcome it is to do it more often" (2011, 349). Unlike Landau, then, Kretschmer's beliefs about his role would have led him to at least attempt to seek out tasks involving killing.
One final example will further illustrate the importance of understanding how perpetrators construe the situations in which they act and their own behavior within those Ignoring this fact leads to a failure to understand the differences in motivations and attitudes that can explain (at least partially) how and why individuals become perpetrators of war crimes.
The above discussion illustrates the differences between our theory of war crimes and the situationist account offered by Doris and Murphy and others. Our view differs from the situationist theory of war crimes in two important respects. Firstly, in our view in order to In our account, by contrast, soldiers' behavior can be understood as the result of a constantly evolving and unique interactive relationship between soldiers' individual psychology and personal history, and the circumstances in which they act. Thus our view offers both greater explanatory power in relation to war crimes and recognizes military personnel as agents who shape and guide their behavior in unique ways.
Excusing Perpetrators
We will now consider the moral responsibility of those who commit war crimes. To say that someone is morally responsible for her behavior is to say, in part, that she is an appropriate candidate for various moral responses on account of that behavior. These responses will be positive or negative depending on the quality of the relevant action. Negative responses are associated with a judgment that the person is morally responsible for bad or wrong behavior.
Such negative responses-for example, attitudes of resentment or indignation-constitute moral blame. If a person is a proper target of these responses, then she is morally responsible in the … we give less than full responsibility to persons who, though acting badly, act in ways that are strongly encouraged by their societies-the slaveowners of the 1850s, the Nazis of the 1930s, and many male chauvinists of our fathers' generation, for example (1987, (56) (57) .
What excuses these wrongdoers is that they "falsely believe that the ways in which they are acting are morally acceptable" (1987, 57) . Possession of these false moral beliefs tends to excuse the wrongdoers in question because the values that inspired these beliefs "may have been inevitable, given the social circumstances in which they developed" (1987, 57 Emotional responses like resentment are reactions to the perception that one has been treated with contempt, ill will, or at least an objectionable sort of disregard. 16 Such responses are inapt-and a wrongdoer excused from blame-in cases where harmful behavior is in fact not expressive of contempt, ill will, or lack of regard. This is why we typically do not blame people who injure us only because they were, through no fault of their own, ignorant of the harmful consequences of their behavior, or when their harmful behavior was justified. 17 Similarly, we do not generally blame those whose harmful behavior was involuntary in certain ways (for example, because the agent was unconscious at the time of action, or because the behavior was the result of coercion, and so on). 18 In each of these cases of excuse, something blocks the otherwise claimed to have acted within the bounds of his conscience-is fully compatible with the torturer having ill will-or at least a lack of appropriate regard-for his victims. Indeed, a plausible default assumption is that such a torturer's behavior is evidence that he implicitly denies that his victims have the sort of moral standing that would make torturing them illegitimate. If we reject the torturer's perspective on his victims' standing, then we should conclude that the torturer does not treat his victims with the degree of respect that we believe that they could reasonably demand, and that he is therefore an appropriate target of his victims' blame.
To take a somewhat more complicated example, consider the way doctors who served at Auschwitz rationalized their participation in the selection of prisoners for gassing and for medical experiments by reference to the moral goals of legitimate medical practice. One doctor stated that: "Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is a gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind" (Lifton 1986, 427) . This doctor understood that his profession him with a gun, the police officer's action is justified even if it turns out that the gun was fake, so long as it was reasonable for the police officer to believe the gun was real and that the offender posed a deadly threat that could only be averted through the use of force.
We can read the doctor's attempted justification in different ways, but none of them are likely to be persuasive. We might, for example, interpret the doctor's comparison of the Jews to a gangrenous appendix as just an expression of his bias against Jews: as if he were inviting us to believe that the Jews deserved harsh treatment because they are contemptible. But this clearly begs the question-we would hardly accept this as a justification of the doctor's behavior unless we already shared his biased outlook on Jews.
But perhaps this is the wrong way to think about the doctor's attempted justification.
Perhaps the doctor's position is like that of Karl Kretschmer, the German soldier discussed earlier, who thought that Jews were a mortal threat to Germany. On this reading, the doctor is not simply inviting us to share his contempt for Jews; he is (like Kretschmer) justifying his behavior Arpaly calls "motivated irrationality" (2003, 101-11). They were not making an "honest mistake" about the threat posed by Jews. Rather, their beliefs-which would have been transparently false to a person of good will-were nurtured and held in place by the kinds of objectionable attitudes and ill will that make blaming responses appropriate. We suspect, for example, that Kretschmer and the Auschwitz doctor did not fairly assess evidence that conflicted with their beliefs: they were, as Arpaly puts, "ready to believe anything about Jews, as long as it was bad" (2003, 103) .
So far, we have assumed that moral excuses function primarily by demonstrating that an agent's action was not expressive of objectionable attitudes like contempt. Thus, on our view, if a Nazi doctor treats Jews with contempt, it is for that very reason unlikely that he will have an excuse that allows him to avoid blame. However, this perspective on excuses can be questioned.
Erin Kelly, for example, has argued that approaches like ours are too narrow since, as Kelly sees it, some agents whose behavior expresses contempt or ill will are not properly open to blame There is certainly something appealing about the idea that it is unfair to blame a person for an action when she would have had great difficulty acting otherwise. However, we suspect that this perspective is most plausible in those cases in which the very thing that makes it difficult for the agent to act otherwise also undermines the attribution to that agent of the attitudes to which blame responds. On our view, what is really doing the excusing work in these cases is not simply the agent's difficulty in acting otherwise, but the fact that the agent's actions do not express blame-grounding attitudes like contempt. For example, suppose that a soldier is ordered to shoot unarmed civilians and finds it very difficult to disobey because he is physically forced to carry out the order or because he knows that he will be shot if he refuses to obey. These explanations for why the soldier finds it difficult to disobey the order make it much less plausible that his behavior can be explained in terms of his attitudes toward those affected by his behavior.
Even if he obeys the order and shoots the civilians, it is still possible that the soldier had no ill will toward them. Depending on the details of the case, on our view the soldier might be excused for his behavior, but the reason why he might be excused would not be because he found it hard to avoid obeying the order, but because of the absence of ill will.
By contrast, imagine a soldier who has difficulty refraining from killing civilians because of the contempt he feels for them⎯he just thinks enemy civilians are scum who deserve to be killed. In this case, we would not be at all inclined to excuse the soldier's behavior regardless of how difficult he might have found it to act otherwise.
We believe, then, that some agents who have difficulty avoiding wrongdoing are blameworthy: namely, those agents whose difficulty does nothing to call into question their Draft only -please do not cite without permission 21 contempt or disregard for others. A perpetrator's belief that bad behavior is permissible may make it difficult for him to avoid bad behavior, but that kind of non-exculpatory difficulty gives us no reason to think that his behavior doesn't express contempt or disregard for others.
Another potential objection to our view involves the assumption that the point of blame is to initiate moral communication with a wrongdoer. For example, we might believe that the purpose of expressions of blame is to elicit a sincere apology from a wrongdoer and to inspire moral recognition on his part. On this view, any conditions that undermine a wrongdoer's ability to take part in this sort of moral "conversation" will also tend to make him an inappropriate target for the responses involved in moral blame. It has been argued on these grounds that psychopaths, for example, are exempt from blame because of their inability to engage with moral reasons and in moral conversations in the way that non-psychopaths do. 19 We do not believe that this objection tells us much about the case of most perpetrators of war crimes. For one thing, while we grant that military training can severely limit perpetrators' ability to recognize certain moral considerations and claims, this does not make them unfit for or incapable of moral reflection and conversation. The average perpetrator is not a psychopath: he does not lack a moral point of view; rather, his inability to respond to certain moral considerations is a function of his commitment to a flawed moral point of view. This is evident from the words of the perpetrators discussed earlier, all of whom rationalized and justified their actions by reference to moral considerations and moral reasons.
Still, once a perpetrator is in the grip of a flawed moral perspective, he is not likely to respond to moral blame in the way that we might wish: he is unlikely to apologize, to alter his behavior, and so on. But we do not believe that this makes blame inappropriate. On our view, the purpose of blame is not exhausted by the possibility of eliciting certain responses from a it can still be a means by which she stands up for herself and protests the treatment that she received. 20 The validity of such a protest does not depend on anyone being converted by it, and insofar as we agree that a victim has not been treated with due regard, we should view her moral protest, expressed through her blaming responses, as appropriate.
Our view is that moral blame is fundamentally a response to the objectionable attitudes that a wrongdoer can have toward those harmed by his actions. Military training and martial culture may impair the sensitivity of military personnel to moral reasons and incline them toward the view that various forms of objectionable behavior are permissible. These factors may in turn make it difficult for military personnel to refrain from committing war crimes and may make them impervious to the moral entreaties of their victims. However, none of these things makes it impossible for military personnel to guide their behavior by their own judgments about how they ought to behave; thus, none of these things entail that the behavior of military personnel cannot express the objectionable attitudes to which blame properly responds.
Luck and the Victim's Perspective
The role of luck in explaining perpetrators' behavior can raise concerns about their moral responsibility. In The Lucifer Effect, Philip Zimbardo cites a number of situational factors to explain why US Army reservists abused prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq: the reservists were untrained for their specific tasks, they were under pressure from military and civilian authorities to help produce intelligence, and they lived in a stressful and often dangerous environment. As a result, their conception of what was acceptable behavior began to shift from We were never trained to be guards. The higher-ups said, 'Use your imagination.
Break them. We want them broke by the time we come back.' As soon as we'd have prisoners come in, sandbags instantly on their heads. They would flexicuff 'em; throw 'em down to the ground; some would be stripped. It was told to all of us, they're nothing but dogs […] . So you start breeding that picture to people, then all of a sudden, you start looking at these people as less then human, and you start doing things to 'em that you would never dream of. And that's where it got scary (Zimbardo 2008, 352) .
As with the students in his Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo doesn't think that the behavior of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib is explained by their possession of antecedent dispositions toward cruelty. The behavior was caused, rather, by the kinds of factors described in the quotation from Ken Davis and by what Zimbardo elsewhere describes as the "intrinsically pathological" prison environment (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, 89) .
But how did the reservists end up in these circumstances? This was largely a matter of luck. The reservists voluntarily enlisted for military service, but prior to their enlistment they had no way of knowing that they would end up at Abu Ghraib and that they would be subjected to the situational pressures that Zimbardo describes. Similarly, as Zimbardo notes, "[c] hance ruled" in determining the outcomes for the subjects in his Stanford experiment (2008, 206) . It was "by virtue of random assignment" that "these good people were … assigned to the role of guard or When we focus on soldiers' lack of control over their exposure to situational pressures, it may seem unfair to hold them morally responsible for the behavior fostered by these pressures. 21 This worry can also be put in terms of the CAPS approach that we outlined above.
Soldiers have little control over the external forces that help to shape their acquisition of CAPS traits, so, again, it may seem unfair to hold them morally responsible for the behavior that these traits inform.
Our response to these concerns echoes the reasoning we employed above. If someone is unlucky enough to have been exposed to pressures that make him unaware of the consequences of his behavior, or unable to control his behavior in light of his judgments about reasons, then he is excused from blame because his behavior is not likely to express the sort of contempt or disregard to which blame responds. However, the perpetrators we have been considering are not unlucky in this way; they remain fully capable of expressing contempt or disregard for others through their behavior.
But perhaps considerations about luck make it unfair to blame perpetrators even if they are capable of treating others with contempt. An argument for this conclusion might go like this:
If luck plays a sufficiently large role in explaining why a perpetrator has bad moral values (or bad dispositions), then he is not at fault for possessing these values, and if he is not at fault for possessing these values, then it is unfair to blame him for the behavior that these values inspire.
We do not accept this argument. Imagine a committed Nazi soldier-perhaps one trained from a young age in the Hitlerjugend-who regards Jews as vermin. Obviously, this soldier has objectionable attitudes toward Jews. However, it might plausibly be said that he is not at fault for But now suppose that the perpetrator was trained in such a way that-through no fault of his own-he came to regard sexual violence against women as a legitimate way of achieving political or military goals. Should we now conclude that the perpetrator is excused and that blame would be inappropriate? If we accept this conclusion, then we must say not only that it is inappropriate for us to blame the rapist, but that it is also inappropriate for his victim to blame him. We find this conclusion very unpalatable.
On our view, the perpetrator's (perhaps unavoidable and nonculpable) belief that he behaves permissibly does not excuse him from blame because nothing about the content of his belief or how it was acquired makes it unreasonable for his victim to resent him. Her claim to A person harmed by another should withhold blame if the harmful behavior did not express ill will or disregard of his moral standing. This would be the case if the harm was accidental, justified, the product of coercion, and so on. But none of this applies to the above example. To say that the rape victim shouldn't blame her rapist asks her to view her rape as if it were the kind of treatment that does not warrant resentment, as if it did not constitute a direct and profound attack on her moral standing⎯in short, it asks her to accept her rapist's perspective.
This asks the rape victim to accept an inaccurate interpretation of what happened to her and fails to adequately account for the wrong done to her. Thus, to suggest that moral blame is off the table fails to do justice to the victim because it misdiagnoses the moral quality and inter-personal significance of the treatment to which she was subjected.
Again, we have argued that what is crucial for blame is the expressive significance of the actions for which a wrongdoer is blamed. A wrongdoer is excused from blame in those cases in which his behavior does not convey blame-grounding attitudes towards others. However, just because a wrongdoer is not at fault for having objectionable attitudes does not mean that these attitudes are not attributable to him and cannot be expressed through his behavior. If a soldier has the bad luck to be exposed to factors that corrupt his values, then this can make him an appropriate object of pity in certain respects, but this fact will not by itself make him an inappropriate target of blame. The claims that we defend in this chapter are separable. That is, one could accept our CAPS account of war crimes and still think that soldiers are often blameless for war crimes because one thinks, for example, that a soldier is excused if he believes that he acts permissibly.
Conclusion
Or one might accept our account of the moral responsibility of perpetrators yet reject our dispositional account of war crimes. However, the two claims fit together naturally: our approach to moral responsibility argues for the centrality of wrongdoers' orientations toward others, and the dispositions hypothesized by CAPS theory play this role. Our application of CAPS theory emphasizes the ways in which perpetrators' behavior is typically not a product of internal states that have been "forced" upon them by external circumstances, but rather reflects their individual 
